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CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH RIGHT-ANGLED ARTIN GROUPS
RAMO´N FLORES AND DELARAM KAHROBAEI
Abstract. In this paper we propose right-angled Artin groups as a platform
for secret sharing schemes based on the efficiency (linear time) of the word
problem. Inspired by previous work of Grigoriev-Shpilrain in the context of
graphs, we define two new problems: Subgroup Isomorphism Problem and
Group Homomorphism Problem. Based on them, we also propose two new
authentication schemes. For right-angled Artin groups, the Group Homomor-
phism and Graph Homomorphism problems are equivalent, and the later is
known to be NP-complete. In the case of the Subgroup Isomorphism problem,
we bring some results due to Bridson who shows there are right-angled Artin
groups in which this problem is unsolvable.
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1. Introduction
Using algorithmic group theoretic problems in cryptography has been an active
area of research since 1999 (see [22] for a thorough account). The complexity of
different algorithmic problems (Conjugacy Problems, Membership Problems, etc.)
have made available a lot of families of groups as platform groups for cryptographic
protocols, as for example:
• Braid groups, using the Conjugacy Search Problem [18].
• Polycyclic groups, using the Conjugacy Search Problem [8], [12].
• Thompson groups, based on the Decomposition Search Problem [26].
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• Hyperbolic groups, using properties of subgroup distortion and the Geo-
desic Length Problem [6].
• Free metabelian groups, based on the Subgroup Membership Search Prob-
lem [27], and in the Endomorphism Search Problem [13].
• Free nilpotent p-groups, for a semidirect product public key [16].
• Linear groups [2].
• Grigorchuk groups, for cryptographic protocols [23].
• Groups of matrices, for a Homomorphic Encryption scheme [10].
Note that some are infinite and some are finite, but they are all non-commutative.
As mentioned above, we propose here right-angled Artin groups for two secret
sharing schemes, as well as two authentication schemes. For the first, we follow the
approach of Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain [13] and Shamir [25], while the second is
a modification of two protocols developed by Grigoriev-Shpilrain [11] in the context
of graphs, that we adapt to the language of right-angled Artin groups by using the
graph which is always associated to these groups. Then, we take advantage of the
fact that many graph-theoretic problems that are proved to be NP-complete can be
translated to a group-theoretic setting in the right-angled Artin groups, and also
of some unsolvability results which are proper from this context. Besides that it is
always of interest to introduce new applications of Group Theory in cryptography,
we also note that working with group presentation is easier and sometimes more
practical than working with graphs. We note that Shpilrain-Zapata have proposed a
key exchange based on Artin groups but this class is much bigger than right-angled
Artin groups [27].
This note is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the main features of
right-angled Artin groups that will be useful for our purposes. Section 3 is devoted
to the description of the sharing schemes, while the authentication schemes are
treated in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we deal with study of the security of the
proposed protocols.
2. Right Angled Artin Groups
First we will introduce the main facts concerning right-angled Artin groups, a
class probably introduced first in [15] by Hauschild and Rautenberg (which called
them semifree groups) in the seventies. Good surveys about the topic can be found
in [19] and [5], while a good general introduction for the theory presentations of
groups is [21].
Definition 2.1 (Right-angled Artin groups). Let Γ denote a finite simplicial graph.
We will write V = V (Γ) for the finite set of vertices and E(Γ) ⊂ V × V for the set
of edges, viewed as unordered pairs of vertices. The requirement that Γ be simplicial
simply means that the diagonal of V × V is excluded from the set of edges. The
right-angled Artin group on Γ is the group
A(Γ) = 〈V |[vi, vj ] = 1 whenever (vi, vj) ∈ E〉.
In other words, A(Γ) is generated by the vertices of Γ, and the only relations are
given by commutation of adjacent vertices.
Observe that right-angled Artin groups, that are associated to a finite simplicial
graph (the Artin graph), are always finitely presented. It is clear from the definition
that there is a bijective correspondence between isomorphism types of right-angled
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Artin groups and isomorphism types of finite simplicial graphs, in the sense that
two right-angled Artin groups A(Γ) and A(Λ) are isomorphic if and only if Γ = Λ.
Moreover, a map f : A1 → A2 of right-angled Artin groups is a homomorphism if
and only if it induces a graph homomorphism between the corresponding graphs.
We will be specially interested in the subgroups generated by subsets of the set
S of generators. If T ⊂ S is such a subgroup of a right-angled Artin groups A,
it is usually denoted by AT and called a special subgroup of A. Note that every
special subgroup of A gives rise to a subgraph of ΓA, but the converse is not true.
For example, if we consider the graph with vertices {v0, v1} and edge [v0, v1], which
corresponds to the free abelian group in two generators, the 0-dimensional subgraph
defined by the two vertices produces the free group in two generators, which is not
a subgroup of Z2. It is easy to see that a subgraph Γ′ of an Artin graph Γ defines
a special subgroup of the corresponding right-angled Artin groups if and only if Γ′
is a full subgraph of Γ.
Definition 2.2. A subgraph Γ′ of a graph Γ is full if for every pair of vertices
{v, w} in Γ′ such that [v, w] is an edge in Γ, [v, w] is an edge in Γ′.
The full subgraphs are also called spanning or induced. This condition is impor-
tant in order to use these subgroups as a platform for authentication.
3. Secret sharing threshold schemes
Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain have proposed a cryptosystem based on efficiency
of the word problem [13], and we intend to use it with right-angled Artin groups.
Let us describe the two schemes.
In the first protocol, which is an (n, n)-threshold scheme, the dealer distributes a
k-column C =


c1
c2
·
·
·
ck

 consisting of bits (0’s and 1’s), among n participants in such
a way that the column can be reconstructed only when all participants combine
their information. A set of generators X = {x1, . . . xm} is public. Then:
(1) The dealer uses a secure channel to assign to each participant Pj a set of
commutators Rj of the generators in X
±. Recall that each right-angled
Artin group Gj = 〈x1, . . . xm|Rj〉 has efficiently solvable word problem (see
Section 5.1 below).
(2) The secret bit column C is split by the dealer in a mod 2 sum
∑n
j=1 Cj on
n bit columns, which are secretly distributed to the n participants.
(3) Words w1j , . . . , wkj in the generators of X are openly distributed by the
dealer to the participant Pj , for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The words are selected
in such a way that wij 6= 1 is ci = 0 and wij = 1 if ci = 1.
(4) Each participant Pj check, for each i, if the word wij = 1 in the right-
angled Artin group Gj is trivial or not. Then, each participant can make
the column C =


c1j
c2j
·
·
·
ckj

 , whose entries are 0’s and 1’s.
(5) The secret can be now reconstructed by forming the vector sum
∑n
j=1 Cj ,
again with the sum taken mod 2.
The second protocol is a (t, n)-threshold scheme, and a modification of the pre-
vious one that takes into account some ideas from [25], and allows a subset of size
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t of the total number of participants n to reconstruct all the information. Now the
secret is an element x ∈ Zp, and the dealer chooses a polynomial f of degree t− 1
such that f(0) = x. In addition the dealer determines integers yi = f(i)(mod p)
that are distributed to participants Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (we assume that all integers x
and yi can be written as k-bit columns). A set of group generators {x1, . . . , xm} is
public.
(1) A set of commutators Rj of the generators in X is secretly distributed to
the participants by the dealer. The group Gj = 〈x1, . . . , xm|Rj is a right-
angled Artin group, and hence it has an efficiently solvable word problem.
(2) Now k-columns bj =


b1j
b2j
·
·
·
bkj

, with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, are openly distributed by
the dealer to each participant, being their entries words in the generators.
The words bij are chosen in such a way that, after replacing them by bits
(the bit “1” if bij is trivial in the right-angled Artin group Gj and “0”
otherwise), the resulting column represents the integer yi.
(3) Now for each word bij , the participant Pj checks if this word is trivial or
not in the right-angled group Gj , and in this way he/she obtains a binary
representation of yj.
(4) Finally, every participant has a point yi = f(i) of the original polynomial,
and then every set of t participants is able now to obtain f by polynomial
interpolation, and also the secret number x = f(0).
Note that every subset of t participants can recover the secret x by constructing
the polynomial f via interpolation, and this scheme can be arranged in such a way
that participants do not have to reveal their individual shares yi to each other if
they do not want to. More details of these protocols can be found in [13].
4. Authentication Schemes Based on the Group Homomorphism and
the Subgroup Isomorphism problems
Grigoriev and Shpilrain have proposed in [11] some authentication protocols us-
ing graph homomorphisms problem and subgraph isomorphism problem. In the
sequel, we introduce two different protocols, which are based on the group homo-
morphism and the subgroup isomorphism problems, and that we introduce using
right-angled Artin groups as a platform; they are inspired by the work of these
authors in the sense that they are originally (but not necessarily) addressed to be
used with group graphs as a platform. In this sense, and as we will see below,
we would make profit of unsolvability results for groups and also for graphs. We
remark that we have developed no analogy of the protocol based in the classical
Graph Isomorphism problem, as it has recently been shown by Babai [1] that its
complexity is quasi-polynomial.
4.1. An Authentication scheme using Group Homomorphism problem.
Consider two finitely presented groups G1 = 〈S1|R1〉 and G2 = 〈S2|R2〉, being Si
generators and Ri relations, i = 1, 2. The Group Homomorphism problem asks if
there is a homomorphism G1 → G2 that takes generators in S1 to generators in S2.
The authentication protocol is the following:
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(1) Alice’s public key consists of two finitely presented groups G1 = 〈S1|R1〉
and G2 = 〈S2|R2〉. Alice’s long term private key is a homomorphism α
sending generators in S1 to generators in S2.
(2) Alice selects another finitely presented group G = 〈S|R〉, and a homomor-
phism β : G → G1 which sends generators in S to generators in S1. Then
she sends G = 〈S|R〉 to Bob, and keeps the homomorphism β to herself.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit and sends c to Alice.
• When c = 0, Alice sends the homomorphism β to Bob, and Bob should
check if β(G) = G1, and if β is a homomorphism that takes generators
in S to generators in S1.
• When c = 1, Alice sends the composite αβ to Bob, and Bob checks
whether αβ(G) = G2, and if the composite is a homomorphism that
takes generators in S to generators in S2.
4.2. An Authentication Scheme Based on the Subgroup Isomorphism
problem. The authentication protocol we propose is as follows:
(1) Alice’s public key consists of two isomorphic subgroups of a group Γ, G1
and G2. Alice’s long-term private key is an isomorphism α : G1 → G2.
(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects a group G together with the isomor-
phism β : G→ G1 and sends the group G (the commitment) to Bob, while
keeping β to herself.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the isomorphism β to Bob, and Bob checks
whether β(G) = G1 and whether β is an isomorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the composition αβ = β(α) to Bob, and Bob
checks whether αβ(G) = G2 and whether αβ is an isomorphism.
5. Complexity and security
In this section we state the complexity results that make right-angled Artin
groups a good platform for the previous protocols.
5.1. Word problem. To introduce a family of groups as a platform for the secret
sharing scheme described [13] it is necessary that its word problem can be solved
efficiently. In the mentioned paper, for example, the authors apply their cryptosys-
tem for small cancellation groups. In the case of right-angled Artin groups, the
easiness of the word problem was first proved in a paper by Liu-Wrathall-Zeger
[20] which in a more general framework of free partially commutative monoids, de-
scribes an algorithm which is effective in linear polynomial time. More recently,
Crisp-Goddelle-Wiest [7] have extended this result (with different methods) to some
families of subgroups of right-angled Artin groups, as for example braid groups.
5.2. Security assumption, complexity analysis and platform groups (right-
angled Artin groups). The security of our proposed authentication schemes re-
lies, for the first scheme, on the difficulty of the Graph Homomorphism problem,
and for the second, on some Bridson unsolvability results. Let us analyze in detail
both situations.
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5.2.1. Group Homomorphism Problem and proposed authentication scheme: We ob-
serve that the problem is equivalent to the Graph Homomorphism problem for
graphs, as there is a bijection between right-angled Artin groups and finite simpli-
cial graphs (see Section 2), and recall that this problem has been shown to remain
NP-complete even when the graph in the right is a triangle [9]. Hence, it would
be enough here to select two right-angled Artin groups Γ1 and Γ2 such that Γ2
contains a free abelian group in three generators.
5.2.2. Subgroup Isomorphism Problem and proposed authentication scheme: Martin
Bridson has proved [3] that there exist families of right-angled Artin groups for
which this problem is unsolvable, even for finitely presented subgroups. Let us
briefly recall the construction. He starts with a free group in a finite number
of generators, and performs over it Rips construction [24] in the specific version of
Haglund and Wise ([14], Section 10). In this way we obtain an explicit presentation
of a hyperbolic group Γ that possess a finite index subgroup Γ0 < Γ, which is
the fundamental group of a special cube complex. This complex is subject to
certain restrictions ([14], Theorem 1.1), that give rise to the existence of a local
isometry with a standard cube complex, and in particular imply the existence of
an embedding of Γ0 in the fundamental group of the latter, which is a right-angled
Artin group and we call A. The group Γ0 also projects onto a non-abelian free
group, and the kernel is infinite and finitely-generated. Then, by a previous result
of Bridson-Miller [4], the subgroup Isomorphism problem is unsolvable for every
product Γ0×Γ0×F , being F any non-abelian free group. As Γ0 < A, the problem
is also unsolvable for A×A× F , and this is a right-angled Artin group itself, as it
is the product of right-angled Artin groups.
In general, to compare the Subgroup Isomorphism problem and the Subgraph
Isomorphism problem we need that the generators and relators on the groups can
be represented as a graph. But this is only a necessary condition. For example, in
right-angled Artin groups there are plenty of subgroups that cannot be represented
by a subgraph of the Artin graph (for example, the cyclic group generated by the
product of two generators). An authentication scheme based in this problem for
right-angled Artin groups only should make use of the special subgroups, and should
take into account the fact that not every subgraph of the Artin graph represents a
special subgroup. This approach is closer to the problem of subgroup isomorphism
for full subgraphs of a finite graph, usually called the induced Subgraph Isomorphism
problem, which is known to be NP-complete in general (see [17] for a reference). For
the classical Subgroup Isomorphism problem, it is more straightforward to appeal
to Bridson unsolvability results described above.
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